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Abstract
Based on a detailed study of the return of national‐level planning in Argentina as embodied by COFEPLAN, the national
planning council, we develop a conceptual framework to analyse the possibilities and limits of steering in governance.
We lean on the theoretical apparatus of evolutionary governance theory and use the concepts of goal dependency, inter‐
dependency, path dependency and material dependency (effects in governance) to analyse the reality effects of strategy
(effects of governance). Methodologically, our study relies on archival work and semi‐structured interviews with planning
scholars and public officials from different levels of government. We show that, although material and discursive reality
effects were abundant in the evolution of Argentine planning policies, dependencies and discontinuities undermined both
the central steering ambitions of the government and the innovative potential of the new planning schemes. The dramatic
history of the Argentine planning system allows us to grasp the nature of dependencies in a new way. Shocks in general
undermine long‐term perspectives and higher‐level planning, but they can also create windows of opportunity. The inter‐
nal complexity and the persistence of Peronist ideology in Argentina can account for the revivals of national‐level planning
in very different ideological contexts, but the recurring shocks, the stubborn difference between rhetoric and reality, the
reliance on informality, created a landscape of fragmented governance and often weak institutional capacity. In that land‐
scape, steering through national‐level planning becomes a tall order.
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1. Introduction
Planning in Argentina has undergone many transforma‐
tions in its roughly 75 years of existence. Changing pow‐
ers, shifting ideologies and fluctuating stakeholder con‐
figurations redefined what planning is and what it could
do (Müller & Gómez, 2013; Settimi & Audino, 2008).
As such, Argentina is a good place to study the poten‐
tial and limits of planning as steering, especially since
national‐level planning was attempted several times.
And it came back in recent years. In the more recent
manifestations of national‐level planning, the Federal
Council for Planning and Territorial Ordering (COFEPLAN)
is one of the most significant organisations. We study
how this organisation evolved, as it sheds a light on the
changing fates of national‐level planning, and, with that,
central steering ambitions in Argentina. One can thus
speak of a nested case study, with COFEPLAN enabling
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us to grasp the difficulties of (re)introducing national
planning, and national planning shedding a light on
planning‐as‐steering.
Theoretically, ourwork is framed by evolutionary gov‐
ernance theory (EGT; Beunen et al., 2015; Van Assche
et al., 2014). EGT offers a unique perspective on the
non‐linearity of transformation in governance by giv‐
ing central place to processes of co‐evolution and the
dependencies which develop. It offers a distinct pic‐
ture of continuity and discontinuity in governance and,
at the same time, an explanation of limits and possi‐
bilities for steering. We combine the EGT‐derived con‐
cepts with a version of strategy thinking which owes
to the strategy‐as‐practice perspective (Jarzabkowski,
2005; Whittington, 1996) and critical management stud‐
ies (Adler et al., 2007; Alvesson & Willmott, 2011).
As steering in governance can be understood as strate‐
gic in nature, strategy thinking enters the picture
quite naturally.
Methodologically, our study relies on archival records
regarding the evolution of COFEPLAN and, more broadly,
the history of national‐level planning in Argentina.
Consultancy reports, minutes of Council meetings,
national plans for economic development, and other
documents complemented these sources. We also con‐
ducted 23 semi‐structured interviews with national and
international planning scholars and public officials from
different levels of government.
The next section introduces key concepts from EGT
which will feature in the case analysis, as well as our
strategy concept and its sources. We then present a
brief historical account of national‐level planning policies
in Argentina. After which we position COFEPLAN in the
Argentine system of planning and governance. A retro‐
spective gaze at themaking of COFEPLAN becomes a van‐
tage point fromwhich to rethink recurrent steering ambi‐
tions within a shifting governance environment. We ana‐
lyse the functioning of COFEPLAN in a governance envi‐
ronment scarred by a series of economic and political
shocks, yet also by remarkable continuities. Finally, we
consider implications for the broader topic of (central)
steering in governance.
2. Theoretical Framing
2.1. Evolutionary Governance Theory
EGT understands governance as radically evolutionary.
That is, all constituent elements of governance config‐
urations transform each other over time in a process
of co‐evolution. This means that a governance path is
never entirely predictable, while each step in its evolu‐
tion is constrained by the previous state of the system.
Path dependency is thus a central concept, one that is
not new. It has been analysed in institutional economics
(David, 1994; Dopfer, 1991; North, 1990, 2005), political
science (Greener, 2005; Pierson, 2000), economic geog‐
raphy (Boschma &Martin, 2007; Martin & Sunley, 2006),
public policy (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Torfing, 2009)
and other disciplines. What gives EGT its distinct theoret‐
ical flavour is that present and future similarly affect the
reproduction and thus evolution of a governance system.
For the present, this is understood through the idea
of interdependencies, between actors, between institu‐
tions (policies, plans, laws), between actors and insti‐
tutions. And it is understood as an effect of power‐
knowledge configurations. Understandings of reality
embedded in the governance configuration, either
through identification (in the case of actors), or through
codification (ideas coded into the rule system of institu‐
tions) shape and constrain the continuing game of inter‐
actions within governance. This idea of interdependence
affecting the evolution of governance stems from sys‐
tems theory (Luhmann, 1995; Teubner, 1993, 2011) and
institutional economics (Greif, 2006; Seabright, 2010).
To grasp the influence of the future, EGT coined
the concept of goal dependencies. Goal dependencies
are the effects of images, narratives or visions of the
future on the reproduction of governance in the present
(cf. Beckert, 2016). The images of the future produced in
the system affect the current functioning of the system.
This can be towards ‘implementation,’ but also in very dif‐
ferent and indirect manners. Such insight is compatible
with both systems theory (e.g., Luhmann, 1990, 2008)
and post‐structuralism, especially in the Foucauldian tra‐
dition. Both utopia and heterotopia, and every dream in
between, can affect the thought and action of actors, the
use and interpretation of institutions and the production
of new ones (Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986).
A fourth dependency which has been recognized
more recently (Birchall, 2020; Schlüter et al., 2020),
partly under influence of recent developments in geog‐
raphy, is that of material dependencies. The most recent
version of transition studies (e.g., Fuenfschilling& Truffer,
2016; Hoffman, 2013) similarly came to recognize the
importance of materiality for the shaping of transition
pathways. Material dependencies are the effect of mate‐
rial objects and environments on the functioning of gov‐
ernance. These effects can be recognized and acted upon
in governance, but not necessarily so—as routinely rec‐
ognized in the environmental policy and climate change
literatures (Beunen & Lata, 2021).
Of particular importance, to grasp the unicity and
explanatory power of EGT, is the idea that governance
evolution never stops, whatever key decisions are taken
or whatever momentous event takes place. Because of
its radically co‐evolutionary character, EGT sees—here
in parallel with actor‐network theory (Latour, 2005)—
potential transformations (and conservatisms) coming
from many directions. So, an idea can shape an actor
who clashes with other actors over the creation of a
new institution but comes to understand that a rein‐
terpretation of an existing institution, a new narrative
publicly framing this reinterpretation can create a dis‐
course coalition (cf. Hajer, 1993). And she comes to
understand that this coalition can further the initial goal
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by transforming it into a more public goal. The configura‐
tion of co‐evolving actors and institutions, of power and
knowledge, keeps itself in motion through this diversity
in pathways and connections. EGT, which was developed
not in opposition to classic public policy literature on con‐
tinuity and change in governance (e.g., Streeck & Thelen,
2005) but emerged from a distinct set of sources (institu‐
tional economics, post‐structuralism, social systems the‐
ory), thus comes to a distinct understanding of continuity
and change.
Certainly, future work can explore a partial integra‐
tion, especially as some of the sources of EGT have also
found an audience within public policy (especially insti‐
tutionalism, and, to a lesser degree, post‐structuralism)
and as some of the key authors in mainstream public pol‐
icy come to similar insights on certain points—especially
on path dependencies (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2009) and,
to a lesser extent, on power (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Richardson,
1996; Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016). We wholeheartedly
embrace such aspirations, but for our present purposes,
it suffices to point out that EGT offers a distinct and cohe‐
sive perspective on change in governance, and on delib‐
erate and strategic attempts at transforming governance.
EGT speaks of rigidity and flexibility in governance evolu‐
tion, with dependencies helping to explain rigidity, and
flexibility coming from deliberate path creation but also
from the interplay between the dependencies. In keep‐
ing with systems theory and complexity theory (Byrne,
1998; Thrift, 1999), the pattern of feedback loops which
can emerge from such interplay creates its own unantic‐
ipated effects, and these can be exploited by actors to
shift the path of governance.
2.2. Strategy, Goal Dependencies and Reality Effects
Goal dependencies become especially relevant when
shared visions for the future are articulated discursively
and become explicitly or implicitly encoded in policies,
plans, project or laws. Such encoding more likely affects
the power/knowledge nexus and the actor/institutions
configuration (Djanibekov et al., 2018; Van Assche et al.,
2014). Furthering goals cannot fully avert nor abruptly
suspend the ‘stickiness’ created by path dependencies
and the interdependent web of actors and institutions in
the governance regime.
Goal dependencies become central to the under‐
standing of a particular governance pathwhen strategies
emerged in that path, aiming for societal steering. This
insight requires us to introduce two more concepts into
our conceptual frame: strategy itself, and secondly, real‐
ity effects. Strategy has been studied primarily within the
confines of private organisations, within management
studies. There is a tradition of strategic (long‐term) spa‐
tial planning (e.g., Albrechts, 2004), and an emerging tra‐
dition of strategic management in public organisations
(e.g., George, 2020). Both provide valuable insights in
governance for the long term and in the necessity for
public actors to think strategically. Yet, few have con‐
sidered the possibilities and limits of strategy at com‐
munity level, strategy in and through governance, and
thereby taken on board recent insights in both strategy
and governance.
We argue that the ideas on strategy espoused in the
so‐called strategy‐as‐practice literature (Jarzabkowski
et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2007), and the strategy lit‐
erature inspired by social systems theory can be utterly
useful here. For the strategy‐as‐practice thinkers, and for
Mintzberg (1978, 1987), one of their key sources of inspi‐
ration, strategies emerge as a result of ongoing bricolage
of intention and unanticipated effects. For the systems‐
inspired thinkers (some of them also versed in strategy‐
as‐practice theory, as e.g., Seidl, 2007) strategies are
constantly reinterpreted, as organisations evolve, as sit‐
uations can be reinterpreted as success or failure, and
results can be reinterpreted as resulting from strategy
or not. Furthermore, and this also resonates with the
critical management literature (Grey & Willmott, 2005),
strategy concepts are also evolving, with new strategy
concepts continuously emerging and affecting the func‐
tioning of organisations and administrations (Fairhurst &
Putnam, 2004).
Strategy at community level has to pass through gov‐
ernance. If we adopt the EGT understanding of gover‐
nance, it transpires quickly that a functioning strategy
has to be both an institution linking other institutions
and a narrative on the future (cf. Wittmayer et al., 2019).
The production and effects of strategy are shaped by
the pattern of flexibility and rigidity as diagnosed by EGT.
Rather than speaking of implementation vs. non imple‐
mentation, we can speak then of goal dependencies trig‐
gered by strategies (see before). While the goal depen‐
dencies concept focuses on the system of governance
itself (effects of futures on current governance), the con‐
cept of ‘reality effects,’ draws our attention to the effect
outside the sphere of governance, e.g., in the environ‐
ment, the community for which the strategy is destined.
Reality effects are those effects of the strategy which
alter discursive realities or materiality, insofar as noticed.
Here, ‘noticed’ means taken up in discourse. Material
effects, on the one hand, refer to changes in the phys‐
ical environment that “matter in governance as reality
effects only after they are observed and interpreted, and
hence only if their meaning is constructed in social sys‐
tems” (Van Assche et al., 2020, p. 700). Discursive effects,
on the other hand, refer to “hanging ways of understand‐
ing stemming from the strategy” (Van Assche et al., 2020,
p. 700). Policies, plans and projects can create reality
effects and trigger goal dependencies, yet only on rare
occasions they bring the envisioned reality into being
exactly as it had been imagined.
In the next sections, we deploy this conceptual frame
to analyse the evolution of COFEPLAN in the context of
an Argentine governance system marked by both shocks
and strong continuities (see Alves Rolo, 2021). The exis‐
tence of COFEPLAN itself is taken as a sign of re‐emerging
steering ambitions.
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3. Planning in the Governance of Argentina
3.1. A Brief Review of Argentine Planning
In order to understand the role of planning in the gover‐
nance system of Argentina, we need to mention first the
history of dramatic shocks in the 20th century. Economic
crises, military coups and changes in ideologies made
the development of a stable planning system virtually
impossible. The maintenance of long‐term perspectives
as such was hard at times. Nevertheless, Argentina
did embrace rather ambitious planning schemes, and
something of a national planning tradition developed.
We refer to Figure 1 for an overview of these discontinu‐
ities in governance, with implications for discontinuities
in planning.
National‐level planning in Argentina can be traced
back to the beginning of the 20th Century (Elena, 2005).
Larger cities were the primary target of planning inter‐
ventions, as they were expected to drive economic
development. The choice can be explained by the rapid
urbanization of Argentina, as well as the sheer size
of the country (Cerrutti & Bertoncello, 2006). Guided
urban redevelopment and expansion were strategies for
addressing social problems, by providing housing for
the poor (Crot, 2006), and giving them a fresh start
in a new environment. Most of the funding, however,
went to infrastructure. Infrastructure investment aimed
at spurring economic development in the main urban
nodes and was intended to visibly legitimize the narra‐
tive of national development (Ciccolella, 2006). Despite
the initial rhetoric ofmore comprehensive planning, over
time planning became seen as infrastructure develop‐
ment, and planners and non‐state actors (e.g., archi‐
tects, urbanists, engineers) learned that plansweremore
likely to have an impact if presented as ‘public works’
(Rigotti, 2014).
After the SecondWorldWar, the central government
became more ambitious. National‐level planning was
still seen as promoting economic development through
infrastructure projects, but those projects were now
spread throughout the country. Meanwhile, resource
extraction and urban development inmore remote areas
were encouraged (Gómez & Lesta, 2008). The National
Planning Council, created in 1951 as part of the Peronist
state apparatus, was responsible for the elaboration
of the Second Five‐Year Plan (1952–1955) that would
define the orientation of Perón’s second term (Official
Bulletin of the Argentine Republic, 1951). However, the
Council was dissolved after the coup of 1955 (Under‐
secretariat of Territorial Planning of Public Investment,
2015). Emerging state‐backed monopolies (builders,
developers) and networks (landowners, industrialists)
were not backing the planning council, while the political
opposition and key stakeholders were absent and recur‐
ring economic crises reduced the scope of state planning.
By the 1960s, the negative effects of rapid urbanisa‐
tion were becoming clear and the push towards devel‐
opment across the regions was intensified. In this con‐
text, a renewed emphasis on planning was endorsed by
the Alliance for Progress, a development aid organiza‐
tion promoted by the Kennedy administration in 1961.
The agreement provided funding to encourage spatial
planning and proposed a set of economic, political and
social measures. Redistribution of wealth and improv‐
ing the living standards of the working classes were
the main goals. This impulse resulted in the creation of
the National Development Council (CONADE) and the
National Planning System in 1961.
CONADE was theoretically informed by ECLAC, a
regional commission of the UN that accompanied the
reforms proposed by the Alliance for Progress and
focused on development of peripheral regions. CONADE
intervened in a multiplicity of policy domains: agricul‐
ture, industry, transport, housing, health, energy, etc.
One of the main CONADE initiatives was the National
Development Plan (1965–1969), during the administra‐
tion of President Arturo Illia (1963–1966). Its implemen‐
tation, however, was interrupted by the military coup
by General Juan Carlos Onganía (1966), who did not
dissolve CONADE but reoriented its work towards secu‐
rity policies.
In 1970 the toppling of Onganía by General Roberto
Levingston (1970–1971) spurred the implementation of
a National Development Plan in an attempt to improve
the dynamism of the internal market. Against the back‐
ground of a messy urbanisation process driven by mas‐
sive rural‐urban migration, the plan proposed the cre‐
ation of development poles. The state would support
relocation of industries to peripheral regions. Although
the plan as a whole did not succeed, development poles
did appear, particularly in Patagonia (Álvarez, 2016).
Perón’s return as President in 1973 gave a new
impulse to planning through the Triennial Plan for
Reconstruction and National Liberation (1974–1977).
This plan sought to mobilize economic policy towards
social justice, ‘rebuilding’ the state, economic indepen‐
dence and Latin American integration. It came with a
political strategy for implementation that included agree‐
ments with various political parties, unions, governors,
and others. Public forums hosted by unions, were orga‐
nized in factories and at universities to discuss the plan.
However, the economic situation after the international
oil crisis (1973) and clashes between the right and left
wings of the Peronist movement after Perón’s death in
1974, among other factors, made this agreement unten‐
able. In this convoluted political and economic situation,
on March 24, 1976 Argentina suffered its sixth coup.
The crisis of the welfare state and the incipient rise
of neo‐liberalism as a new order in the mid‐1970s were
accompanied by a process of de‐legitimization of the
steering state. The concept of a small, efficient, and
enabling state gained traction (Marengo, 2008). This
resulted in a profound reform of the political and insti‐
tutional structure of the country. Historically national
competences were decentralized. The new development
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Figure 1. Continuities and changes affecting the evolution of governance in Argentina.
paradigm reduced the role of the national government
in promoting a balanced and inclusive development.
The main cities, such as Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario
and Mendoza, were presented as vigorous, agile and
largely self‐sufficient productive entities, capable of inno‐
vation and strong enough to boost economic growth
nationally. Whilst competition grew among municipali‐
ties to attract foreign investment, the local scale became
the main focus of planning (Catenazzi et al., 2019).
International organisations (UNDP, OECD, World Bank,
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among others) sponsored ‘Local Development Plans’ in
the belief that decentralised planning policies would
encourage more efficient and innovative interventions.
Thus, since the mid–1970s and especially during the
1990s, planning in neo‐liberal Argentina was basically
concentrated in ad hoc projects without a coherent
national spatial strategy.
The 1990s were characterized by economic stabil‐
ity, with inflation kept in check. In the early years, pri‐
vatization of state companies and public utilities made
it possible to reduce debt. However, 1998–2002 were
years of recession,with long‐termeffects on both politics
and spatial organisation. In December 2001, President
Fernando de la Rúa had to resign and was succeeded
by five presidents in two weeks. The legacies of that
recession are still visible: Infrastructure deteriorated, the
shrinking economy relied more on informal jobs, under‐
mining the potential for recovery. Inequality between
classes and between regions grew.
The government of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007)
decided that the nation needed a long‐term perspec‐
tive again. Strategic guidelines for national develop‐
ment were articulated. Infrastructure investment, under
the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment
and Services, was pivotal. The Under‐secretariat for
Spatial Planning of Public Investment was created to
recover planning as a governance tool at the ser‐
vice of all levels of government. Its key achievement
was the implementation of the Strategic Spatial Plan
‘Bicentennial Argentina.’ The plan devised a model of
multi‐level governance which was to guide the public
investment process. Provinces participated through polit‐
ical representatives—mainly ministers of development,
infrastructure and public works—in the elaboration of a
national planning agenda.
3.2. COFEPLAN and Its Preceding Steering Organisations
The federal organisation of the country implies that spa‐
tial planning is a responsibility shared by the national,
provincial and local political authorities (Erbiti, 2011).
However, the national government lacks a legal frame‐
work to guide planning. With exceptions such as Buenos
Aires and Mendoza, the provincial regulatory frame‐
works have great difficulty overseeingmunicipal land use
planning. At the same time, provincial administrations
create planning difficulties for municipalities.
Provinces over time delegated limited responsibili‐
ties to municipalities and where they did, sometimes
resources did not follow responsibilities, in other cases,
land use planning authority was not combined with
local authority over other policy domains. This pre‐
vented municipalities from integrating land use plan‐
ning with transportation systems and from developing
long‐term strategies for public works (Muzzini et al.,
2017). Municipalities were granted greater planning
autonomy through the 1994 constitutional reform, but
they still lacked technical capacity and financial incen‐
tives to update land use regulations—another reason
why provincial planning offices remain significant (Goytia
et al., 2010). As a result, new planning initiatives involve
coordination between different tiers of government.
The COFEPLANwas created in December 2008 to address
this coordination problem.
COFEPLAN is a national agency under the Ministry
of Planning which brings together the City of Buenos
Aires and the 23 provinces at least twice a year to
discuss the development and harmonization of plan‐
ning policies. Composed of three working committees,
this Council “was given a mandate to issue guide‐
lines that would address planning bottlenecks in the
specific legal framework of each province” (Muzzini
et al., 2017, p. 180). Those frameworks, in other words,
were supposed to remain intact and remain guiding.
COFEPLAN was not initially expected to produce poli‐
cies, plans or projects, nor a national planning law. It
was intended to promote knowledge dissemination, leg‐
islative work and consensus‐building among decision‐
makers. Nevertheless, it did participate in the drafting of
several versions of the National Planning Law, versions
presented to the National Congress in 2009, 2011, 2013
and 2018. However, some provinces put up strong resis‐
tance and the law has not yet been enacted (Muzzini
et al., 2017).
Praised as innovative (Corti, 2008), COFEPLAN was
not entirely a first. Different steering organisations pro‐
moting national policies for land management and terri‐
torial development predated the organisation. In order
to understand the functioning of COFEPLAN, its possibil‐
ities and limits of steering, we need to understand the
evolution of national steering organisations leading to
COFEPLAN. Figure 2 summarizes the development.
The National Postwar Council (CNP) was created
by the military regime after the coup d’état of 1943
with the aim of conducting “studies on the social
and economic ordering of the country…its coordina‐
tion, planning and implementation” (Official Bulletin
of the Argentine Republic, 1944). This Council was
part of a network of planning and economic manage‐
ment organisations—some already installed since the
1930s—promoting State interventionism and central‐
ized decision‐making (Gómez & Tchordonkian, 2010).
Domestic industry had expanded during the War and
the government was worried about normalization of
international trade. The CNP produced a Plan for Social
and Economic Ordering which was supposed to help the
country facing stiffer competition after the war. It cre‐
ated agencies to analyse the socio‐economic conditions
of each province. Public and private sector actors com‐
peted for influence over the definition of priorities for
public investment (Belini, 2009).
Coordination of sectorial interests through a network
of public agencies was the main form of national‐level
planning, while institutional capacity developed through
absorption of academic experts, private sector special‐
ists and already existing technical units. The CNP was
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remarkably ambitious. It intended to coordinate the
activities of several ministries towards national develop‐
ment goals (Gómez & Tchordonkian, 2010). Studies con‐
ducted by the CNP gave shape to the First Five‐Year Plan,
a development strategy combining economic and spatial
planning (as in socialist countries).
In September 1948 an Inter‐ministerial Coordinating
Council was established in order to overcome the admin‐
istrative problems encountered during plan implemen‐
tation. This Council was responsible for “comprehen‐
sive planning, coordination and verification of the evo‐
lution of the plan within all state agencies” (Falivene
& Dalbosco, 2007, p. 13). Additionally, the Federal
Coordinating Council was launched to manage prob‐
lems arising between the national government and the
provinces. Later, in 1950, the National Planning Direction
was organized under the Ministry of Technical Affairs
with the task of studying and proposing a “scientific
organisation of government and administration” (Official
Bulletin of the Argentine Republic, 1949). In 1951,
the Inter‐ministerial Coordinating Council became the




























Figure 2. The main planning councils that preceded
COFEPLAN.
The Federal Investment Council—created in 1959—is
also an early reference for what COFEPLAN would later
be, dating back to the so called ‘golden era’ of plan‐
ning in Argentina (Canelo, 2012). The mission assigned
to the Federal Investment Council was very similar to
that of COFEPLAN: To promote the harmonious and
comprehensive development of the country based on
solidarity and decentralization. At the same time, the
influence of Buenos Aires never really abated, and the
collaboration between ministries, and between min‐
istries and provinces, was never easy (Keeling, 1994;
Loew, 1977). The Federal Investment Council was behind
the establishment of CONADE, in 1960, which then led
to the adoption of the ‘National Development Plan’ of
1965. That plan in turn was supported by a new organi‐
sation, the Inter‐provincial Council of Ministers of Public
Works. The organisation still exists and brings together
topofficials of PublicWorks and Services of the provinces.
The Inter‐provincial Council of Ministers of Public Works
opened up intra‐governmental processes of participa‐
tion and became a precedent‐setting organisation that
has been instrumental in positioning COFEPLAN as a
main steering organisation.
3.3. COFEPLAN and Its Results
Despite the difficulties inherent to a fragmented and frag‐
ile institutional framework, COFEPLANachieved progress
in several areas. It increased the political clout and tech‐
nical capacities of local planning offices. This enabled
them to develop a more integral territorial approach to
administration. In addition, COFEPLAN created adminis‐
trative mechanisms to promote inter‐sectorial and inter‐
jurisdictional collaboration between government agen‐
cies. This often benefited the coordinated expansion
of infrastructure networks. COFEPLAN further assumed
responsibilities in the regulatory scaffolding of planning,
even when law‐making in planning is reserved for the
provinces under the terms of article 121 of the National
Constitution (Maldonado, 2010). Moreover, as shown in
Table 1, the Council has contributed on several occa‐
sions to different Drafts of the Framework Law and, at
present, is working on a draft Law of Territorial Planning
and Habitat.
4. Analysis
Argentina has a unique history of governance. Economic
recessions, currency collapse, military coups and ideo‐
logical shifts were major shocks to society and to the
governance system (Duit & Galaz, 2008). In this situa‐
tion, it is not evident that long‐term perspectives and
strategies can develop, be maintained, and adapted.
Resources could evaporate after a crash, hierarchies
reshuffled after a coup, and lower‐level governments
and regions abandoned.
Nevertheless, dependencies in the evolution of gov‐
ernance and planning can be distinguished. In terms of
spatial planning the most dramatic system shock was
the period 1975–2002, a generation where the national
ideology seemed decidedly anti‐planning (Müller, 2011).
In that period, provinces had not given up on economic
and spatial planning, and even de‐centralizing policies
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Table 1.Main results achieved by COFEPLAN.
Year Results
2009 Survey of the situation of the provinces
Comparative analysis of planning and development laws in different countries
Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning (first sketch)
2010 Training agreement with national universities
National and international forum on spatial planning and land use planning
Training of provincial technical teams
Diagnosis of progress in the development of geographic information systems and spatial data infrastructure in
each province
Diagnosis of the relationship between provincial planning teams and the provincial cadastres
Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning
Reports on the state of affairs of provincial legislation regarding land use planning
National Meeting ‘Territorial Planning as State Policy’
2011 ‘Declaration of Iguazú’ on the need to strengthen COFEPLAN, promote the draft law, support provincial
and local legislative initiatives, spur institutional strengthening and contribute to making territorial
problems visible
Discussion forum on the Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning
2012 Foresight workshops ‘The territories of the future’
Modification of the Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning
2013 Formation of a federal planning network
Modification of the Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning
Creation of a system of territorial indicators
2014 Creation of the Identification and Weighting System for Strategic Projects
Bases for the elaboration of provincial laws
Border Territorial Integration program
Planning and Territorial Ordering Guidelines document
Contribution to the Spatial Data Infrastructure of the Argentine Republic (IDERA)
Characterization of territories based on the law of environmental protection of native forests
Regional Commission of the Colorado River Basin
2015 Act of agreement on the Preliminary draft of the Framework Law on Territorial Planning
2016 Agreement for institutional strengthening between the Secretary of Strategic Planning, Land Management
and Habitat, the Under‐secretariat of Planning and Infrastructure and the Under‐secretariat of Territorial
Planning of Public Investment
2017 Act of adhesion to the Program of Institutional Strengthening for Territorial Planning whereby the national
government would provide financing for equipment and training
Creation of the Federal Urban Observatory
Seminars on urban issues and Disaster Risk Reduction
2018 Draft Framework Law on Territorial Planning
2019 Implementation of the Prosperous Cities Index (UN methodology)
Reconstruction Process in Comprehensive Risk Management (book)
Study of the expansion of the urban area
aiming to empower local governments, often ended up
empowering provinces (Ardanaz et al., 2014). In addition,
the instabilities at national level caused a slow accumula‐
tion of power at the provincial level. The national crises
did not only make planning more difficult, but they also
caused a recurring demand and hope for planning.When
Argentina finally emerged out of the crisis of 1998–2002,
that response, the call for planning, was not an isolated
event, but depended on the institutional memory in gov‐
ernance, and in academia. That a ‘golden age’ of planning
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is recognized in the 1950s–1970s indicates the nostal‐
gia for and identification with national level planning
projects. The provinces had to be acknowledged in any
revival of such project (Calvo & Escolar, 2005). While
the fragmentation of local power had to be addressed,
if any national strategy wanted to have the territory‐
wide effects envisioned. The Inter‐provincial Council of
Ministers of PublicWorks survived as the kernel of a coor‐
dination mechanism.
In the case of Argentine planning, an enabling fac‐
tor, or a positive path dependency, is clearly the Peronist
legacy. In Peronist ideology territorial integrity, integra‐
tion, and development were primary aims. A strong
state apparatus was considered the locus for national
strategies towards those aims (Berrotarán, 2003). Several
regimes identified as Peronists and a simple left‐right ide‐
ological label cannot be applied to themovement and the
discourse. Within the same regime, there could be sig‐
nals and state actors which can be interpreted as far left
and others as far right, while many actors would simply
consider themselves ‘Peronists.’ The ‘golden age’ of plan‐
ning was a period where economic and spatial planning
(in socialist tradition) was integrated in national strate‐
gies. Different from socialist states, such as the USSR,
Peronist Argentina did not develop the stability and the
detailed hierarchical organisation which would allow for
the local implementation of a national planning strategy.
The reality effects of previous national strategies
were overall weak therefore, with few exceptions in
peripheral regions, where the national planning agen‐
cies could engage in relatively unchecked develop‐
ment projects. When national planning re‐emerged, and
COFEPLAN emerged, acceptance of a national planning
strategy therefore was strong. Yet, strong provinces
and fragmented local institutions—legacies of the his‐
tory of instability—could not be ignored (Benton, 2009).
The legacies make it hard to coordinate between lev‐
els, between places, and between sectors and policy
domains, while such coordination is all the more neces‐
sary because problems becamemore complex over time.
The prevalence of informal institutions, settlements, and
jobs—also responses to continued instability and state
absence—aggravates this institutional weakness, makes
it harder to recover economically and to steer from
the centre.
Even in times of decentralization and in periods focus‐
ing on peripheral development, the general assumption
in national politics was that what is good for Buenos
Aires is good for Argentina. As the population of the
capital also boomed, and as economic capital and elites
concentrated in the capital, the city became harder and
harder to ignore. It could not be treated as just a city.
The constitutional reform of 1994 granted the city an
autonomous regime. Hence its presence in COFEPLAN,
together with the provinces. The pattern of interdepen‐
dencies which developed is thus rather complex, with
national agencies depending on provinces less willing
to accept national strategies, on Buenos Aires, which
sees itself as the country. Provinces are dependent on
municipalities but also unable to push through compre‐
hensive strategies because of institutional fragmenta‐
tion and weakness at the local level (Tommasi, 2002).
Growing municipalities might not have had the means
to organize this growth, while places with plans did not
see much growth, and whatever happened tended to be
disconnected from those plans.
At the national level, the planning agencies com‐
peted with other actors, often with other ministries.
Those ministries had their own projects, sometimes
strategies, their own relations with provinces and local
governments. The rhetoric of policy integration thus
never fully resonated with reality, even when national
planning strategies had broad support andwere enacted.
Elite competition, which included segments of political,
economic, military and sometimes academic elites, tran‐
spired in the competition between ministries and their
projects (Van Gunten, 2015). It undermined the real‐
ity effects of any overarching strategy for spatial devel‐
opment. One seeming constant was the emphasis on
infrastructure works, often not under the auspices of a
national planning authority, but at least associated with
national administration. When COFEPLAN was formed,
this looked then as a natural terrain, an initial core,
for a national spatial policy. On the other hand, other
national actors were not interested in handing control
to COFEPLAN, and, without far‐reaching policy coordi‐
nation with local and regional governments, infrastruc‐
ture could not function properly as a driver of eco‐
nomic development.
Social housing, also close to the COFEPLAN man‐
date, proved even more difficult (Catenazzi et al., 2019).
Social housing is arguably even more important for inclu‐
sive economic development, but notoriously expensive
and hard to coordinate. The meagre achievements of
COFEPLAN on this terrain are not surprising, therefore.
That the even harder task of coordinating housing, infras‐
tructure and land use, where most added value for
any national planning strategy ought to be found, could
not be fulfilled, is not surprising either. The path cre‐
ation that became possible after the prolonged shock of
1998–2002 could not create an entirely new path.
The effects of earlier strategies on governance are
thus far from a history of ‘implementation.’ Goal depen‐
dencies slowly crystallized, modified by external shocks
which diverted them from producing strong reality
effects. The fragmented institutional landscape that now
hinders a national planning strategy cannot be attributed
merely to those external shocks. It should also be con‐
sidered a result of older goal dependencies in the land‐
scape of multi‐level governance, a history of diverse
responses to national steering attempts. An oscillation
between belief in central planning ambitions, and, on
the other hand, a cynical distrust of any planning initia‐
tive, further hampers the formation of reality effects in
the direction intended by the national strategy (Müller &
Gómez, 2013).
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5. Conclusions
The creation of COFEPLAN signalled a renewed central
steering ambition in Argentine planning. It was enabled
by path dependencies which included the existence of
a coordinating organisation linking to provincial public
works ministries. There was the memory of a golden age
of national planning, a lingering modernist‐Peronist idea
of territorial development and integration. The steering
ambitions were hindered by other path dependencies,
including weak and fragmented local governance, and
provinces which emerged asmore powerful from the his‐
tory of ups and downs in Argentina (Ardanaz et al., 2014).
That same fragmented landscape can be interpreted
partly as a result of old goal dependencies. Infrastructure
projects across the country, interpreted as a sign that
the centre could steer, can be seen as a material depen‐
dency, yet not in the direction intended by the new strat‐
egy. Dependencies undermined both the central steering
ambitions of the government and the innovative poten‐
tial of the new planning schemes.
Ideologies of national planning, as discourses under‐
pinning steering attempts, can lose and regain explana‐
tory power in relation to an environment that adapts
to new narratives. Society in Argentina responded to
shocks, to a sometimes devastating oscillation between
great expectations and dashed hopes. National plan‐
ning is an unlikely survivor of such structural instability.
National‐level planning in Argentina re‐emerged out of a
set of (in)formal rules that have been re‐assembled mul‐
tiple times under different ideological influences and in
relation to a shifting governance environment (Müller &
Gómez, 2013). A core of shared Peronism fits a core plan‐
ning goal of addressing ‘territorial imbalances,’ which
could be embraced under different regimes, and formed
an argument for planning as such. While the differ‐
ence between ideology and reality in Peronism created
an eternal return of implementation problems for any
national planning strategy. Elite competition, left–right
cracks within the ideology, reduction of planning to
infrastructure projects, the dominance of Buenos Aires,
were all part of reality from the beginning, while flying in
the face of an ideology of inclusive, integrative develop‐
ment under national auspices.
A more general lesson transpires here. Steering
throughmanaging the reality effects of strategy is depen‐
dent on both the legacies and the memories of previ‐
ous steering attempts. This we knew from the history
of the high modernist state, as studied by Scott (1998),
but also by Luhmann (1997), who observed that steer‐
ing is made easier first of all by a history of steering.
We can add that, in a revival of steering, several features
of that history are relevant in understanding the fate of
future attempts. First there is the balance between con‐
tinuity and discontinuity in governance, with discontinu‐
ity generally undermining enabling legacies for steering,
but sometimes creating windows of opportunity, by cre‐
ating a new appreciation of stability and of long‐term
futures (cf. Van Assche et al., 2021). Second, there is
the relation between formal and informal institutions
in the governance system, with a reliance on informal‐
ity generally indicating fragmentation, weak governance,
and low reality effects of strategy. Third, there is the
internal cohesion of the steering ideology. When cohe‐
sion is weak the difference between rhetoric and reality
will be significant, and this contributes to the divergence
between intention and actual effects. Certainly, these
internal cracks might be forgotten and old problematic
decisions can be repeated. In terms of goal dependen‐
cies, this can be translated not as a typology of depen‐
dencies, but as a typology of contexts which will shape
those dependencies.
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